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Abstract 
According to radical versions of embodied cognition, human cognition and agency should be explained without 
the ascription of representational mental states. According to a standard reply, accounts of embodied cognition 
can explain only instances of cognition and agency that are not “representation-hungry”. Two main types of such 
representation-hungry phenomena have been discussed: cognition about “the absent” and about “the abstract”. 
Proponents of representationalism have maintained that a satisfactory account of such phenomena requires the 
ascription of mental representations. Opponents have denied this. I will argue that there is another important 
representation-hungry phenomenon that has been overlooked in this debate: temporally extended planning 
agency. In particular, I will argue that it is very difficult to see how planning agency can be explained without 
the ascription of mental representations, even if we grant, for the sake of argument, that cognition about the 
absent and abstract can. We will see that this is a serious challenge for the radical as well as the more modest 
anti-representationalist versions of embodied cognition, and we will see that modest anti-representationalism is 
an unstable position. 
1. Introduction 
According to traditional and mainstream views in the philosophy of mind and cognitive 
science, the explanation of human cognition and agency requires the ascription of mental 
representations. More recently, this standard view has come under sustained attack from 
proponents of alternative accounts in terms of embodied cognition. Broadly speaking, we can 
distinguish between two main strands of this challenge. According to a radical version, human 
cognition and agency should be explained without any reference to mental representations. 
According to a more modest version, only the explanation of certain higher kinds of cognition 
and agency requires the ascription of mental representations—the bulk of human behavior can 
and should be explained as embodied cognition and without the ascription of representational 
mental states. In the debate on this, two standard responses have emerged. According to the 
first, instances of embodied cognition and agency can be explained just as well in terms of 
representational entities and mechanisms that are operative at sub-personal levels. This 
response addresses the modest and the radical version of the challenge. But it establishes only 
a stand-off, as it proposes only alternative representationalist explanations of embodied 
cognition and agency. The second reply addresses first and foremost the radical challenge. It 
says, in broad outline, that this challenge fails, because it is based on examples of embodied 
cognition and agency that are not sufficiently “representation-hungry” (Clark & Toribio 
1994). For the most part, our focus will be on this second reply. But we will see that there is a 
representation-hungry phenomenon that raises a serious challenge for both the radical and the 
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more modest anti-representationalist versions of embodied cognition, and we will see, 
moreover, that modest anti-representationalism is an unstable position. 
Two main types of representation-hungry phenomena have been discussed: cognition 
about “the absent” and cognition about “the abstract”. In the debate on this, it has been 
assumed that anti-representationalists can avoid the counterchallenge from representation-
hunger if they can show that cognition about the absent and the abstract are not 
representation-hungry after all. I will argue that this assumption is mistaken, because there is 
another important representation-hungry phenomenon that has been overlooked—namely, our 
ability to engage in planning agency. First, I will show that planning agency cannot be 
reduced to cognition about the absent and abstract. Then I will show that it is very difficult to 
see how anti-representationalist versions of embodied cognition can explain planning agency, 
even if we grant, for the sake of argument, that they can explain cognition about the absent 
and abstract. I will argue, in other words, that planning agency is representation-hungry, even 
under the assumption that cognition about the absent and the abstract are not. 
2. Representationalism 
Representationalism is the traditional and, still, mainstream view in the philosophy of mind 
and cognitive science. It says, very roughly, that the explanation of human cognition and 
agency requires the ascription of mental representations.1 There is no generally agreed 
account of the nature of mental representation. For our purposes, it will suffice to work with 
the following minimal characterization. A mental representation is presumed to be an agent-
internal “stand in”: an internal state or process that is about something and that has the 
potential to initiate and guide the agent’s interactions with the world (Haugeland 1991, Clark 
& Toribio 1994, Markman & Dietrich 2000, for instance). This is not meant to be a definition 
in any strict sense. Most obviously, this characterization appeals to the notion of “aboutness”, 
which is as much in need of explanation as the notion of mental representation itself.2 But it 
                                                
1 This formulation is sufficiently general and precise in order to set the scene, as it were. According to a more 
general version, all instances of cognition and agency, including non-human cognition and agency, are to be 
explained in terms of mental representations. According to a less general version, core cases of human cognition 
and agency are to be explained in terms of mental representations. 
2 There is an alternative minimal characterization, according to which mental representations are agent-internal 
physical states that are the vehicles of content. There is no apparent advantage in appealing to content, as 
opposed to aboutness, as those two notions are very closely related and as they are both as much in need of 
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does capture the basic idea, and it is generally agreed that this minimal characterization is 
substantial enough in order to open a genuine debate on the question of whether or not we 
need to evoke mental representations in the explanation of human cognition and agency. 
Further, it is generally held that there are two main types of mental representations: belief-like 
states and desire-like states. The former represent the world to be a certain way. The latter 
represent goals or how the world is to be. This distinction helps to elucidate the notion of a 
“stand in”, as belief-like and desire-like states appear to have the potential to stand in for 
things that are not present in the agent’s current environment. 
3. Embodied cognition and anti-representationalism 
Over the past few decades, various alternatives to representationalism have emerged. It is now 
common to refer to them collectively as approaches in “4E cognition”, as they tend to 
emphasize the embodied, enactive, embedded, and extended nature of cognition and agency 
(Menary 2010, for instance). There are, by now, many different views that fall under this 4E 
approach. We do not need to concern ourselves in detail with the differences between those 
positions, but a few clarifications are in order. First of all, not all proponents of 4E cognition 
are anti-representationalists. Most, in fact, are committed to some form of 
representationalism, and they argue usually only that traditional accounts of mental 
representation need to be revised or replaced. Arguably, the notion of embodiment is at the 
core of the 4E approach. Embodiment does not entail the other three notions. But, in the 
actual world, embodied minds are always embedded in an environment with which they 
interact by enacting their embodied skills and dispositions. This embodied interaction is often 
“scaffolded” by the use of external “props” and through participation in conventional and 
social practices. And this, in turn, fuels many of the claims and speculations about the 
extended mind. In what follows, I will use “embodied cognition” as an umbrella term for 
views that offer or seek alternative non-traditional accounts of human cognition and agency, 
and our focus will be on anti-representationalist versions of this approach. 
What motivates embodied cognition, and what motivates anti-representationalism? 
Some versions of embodied cognition are inspired by the phenomenological works of 
Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty (Dreyfus 1991, 2002a, for instance). Some are 
motivated by and based on more recent developments in robotics (Brooks 1991) and 
                                                                                                                                                   
explanation as the notion of mental representation itself. Some may prefer the formulation in terms of an internal 
stand in, as opposed to a physical vehicle, because it avoids the explicit commitment to physicalism. 
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dynamical systems theory (Beer 1995, van Gelder 1995, Chemero 2009, Silberstein & 
Chemero 2011). Common to all is the focus on our skillful and “online” engagement with the 
world: the ability to engage with others and with one’s circumstances by responding to the 
demands of the situation in a skillful and often effortless manner, without conscious 
deliberation, reasoning, or planning—often called “skilled coping”. Examples from 
phenomenological reflection on human agency include habitual actions, such as the actions 
that one performs while driving a car, and cases where the agent is engaged in a responsive 
flow of interaction, such as in jazz improvisation or in verbal exchanges. Examples from 
robotics and dynamical systems theory include the ability to navigate through novel 
environments and the coordination of limb movements. (We will turn to dynamical systems 
theory in section 6.5.) 
Anti-representationalists argue that such cases of skilled coping raise a challenge for 
representationalism. It seems that the explanation of skilled coping in terms of mental 
representations would be both costly and clumsy. It would, that is, impose very high demands 
on the agent’s information-processing resources and it would lead to an inelegant and 
implausible overpopulation of highly specific mental representations (to explain the initiation 
and guidance of complex bodily movements). Further, it seems that the explanation of skilled 
coping does not require the ascription of representational mental states, because it can be 
explained in terms of behavioral dispositions and direct guidance by the relevant features of 
the situation (more on this in section 6.1 and 6.3). Taken together, those points motivate the 
modest challenge to representationalism mentioned above. According to this modest anti-
representationalism, a significant portion of human cognition and agency is best explained 
without the ascription of mental representations (Lakoff & Johnson 1980, Dreyfus 1991, 
2002a, Gallagher 2005, for instance). Some go further and hold that we will, eventually, be 
able to explain all kinds of cognition and agency without the ascription of mental 
representations. Furthermore, anti-representationalists often maintain that current accounts of 
mental representation are untenable or, at least, controversial, and that there is no obvious 
reason to think that there will ever be a generally accepted account of mental representation. 
This leads us to the mentioned radical challenge. According to this radical anti-
representationalism, we should seek to explain all instances of cognition and agency, 
including all instances of human cognition and agency, without the ascription of mental 
representations (Brooks 1991, Varela et al. 1991, van Gelder 1995, Thompson 2007, Chemero 
2009, Hutto & Myin 2013, 2014). 
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According to this formulation, radical anti-representationalism is a methodological 
imperative. It holds that we should seek explanations without ascribing mental 
representations, and it is to be distinguished from the ontological claim that there are no 
mental representations. The ontological claim is, in a sense, more radical. But the outlined 
argument for the methodological claim would seem to provide the main reason for holding 
the ontological claim. In any case, in order to engage with anti-representationalism, we need 
not engage with the ontological claim. We can restrict our focus to the methodological claim. 
4. Two standard responses 
As mentioned, there are two common lines of response to the anti-representationalist 
challenges. The first appeals to sub-personal entities and mechanisms, the second is the 
response from representation-hunger. Our focus here will be the second response, which is 
first and foremost a response to radical anti-representationalism. But I will nevertheless begin 
with a brief sketch of the first line of response. This will provide an important background for 
the assessment of the anti-representationalist challenge, which will become relevant when we 
turn to modest anti-representationalism in section 7. 
4.1 Sub-personal entities and mechanisms 
According to the anti-representationalist challenge, explanations of skilled coping in terms of 
mental representations would be costly and clumsy, as I have put it. It is common to address 
this with the following qualification. According to representational theories, the explanation 
of human agency requires the ascription of mental representations that initiate and guide 
action. This does not mean that the agent must consider the relevant contents in conscious 
reasoning. If one holds, for instance, with Davidson (1963) that intentional actions are to be 
explained in terms of desires and beliefs, one is not thereby committed to the view that the 
agent must consider the contents of the relevant desires and beliefs in deliberation (Davidson 
1978).3 Similarly, if one holds that intentional actions are initiated and guided by intentions, 
one is not committed to the view that the agent is consciously aware of the relevant intentions 
(before or during the execution of action). One may hold, rather, that the relevant intentions 
must be consciously accessible, not necessarily accessed (Mele 2009, for instance). 
                                                
3 Davidson gives the example of an agent who adds spice to a stew with the intention of improving the taste, and 
he claims that what is required for this to be an intentional action is only that “he must have attitudes and beliefs 
from which, had he been aware of them and had the time, he could have reasoned that his action was desirable” 
(1978: 85). 
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With this qualification, representationalists want to make it clear that explanations of 
cognition and agency in terms of mental representations are not as costly as they might seem. 
But this response leaves the related charges of clumsiness and overpopulation unaddressed. It 
may still seem that explanations in terms of mental representations cannot explain the 
smoothness and ease with which many instances of skilled coping are executed, and it may 
still seem that we would obtain an implausible overpopulation with mental states in the 
explanation of complex movements—think, for instance, of all the finger movements that 
have to be initiated and guided when one is playing the piano or typing on a keyboard. 
In order to address this, it has become common to refer to the sub-personal entities and 
mechanisms that one can find in scientific theories of motor control. According to one 
standard approach in cognitive science, the control of movements is explained in terms of 
“motor schemata” (also called “motor programs”). Motor schemata are theoretical entities and 
they are often characterized as “internal models” that consist, very roughly, of sets of 
commands that initiate and guide the execution of movements (Jeannerod 1997, Clarke 2010). 
For us, the important point is that they are assumed to be sub-personal entities that represent 
goal-states—they are assumed to be representational entities. According to schema theory, 
motor schemata are acquired and developed through experience and learning in an active 
engagement with the world. Once a schema for a certain movement has been built up with 
practice, it can then be executed with little effort and with no need of conscious attention or 
guidance. In other words, motor schemata often operate automatically in the service of 
higher-level goals and intentions, and they usually become embedded in hierarchical 
structures of goal-pursuit and intentional action. This, it should be noted, is perfectly in line 
with common experience, as we all know that the initiation and coordination of motor skills 
gets a lot easier with practice. When, for instance, one first learns how to play a chord on the 
guitar, one first attends to individual finger movements with the intention of moving and 
placing them in certain ways. With practice, simply intending to play the chord will suffice to 
play the chord, and eventually playing the chord can be initiated and guided by an intention to 
play a tune that features that chord. 
Further, motor schema theory is now often supplemented with a feedback-comparator 
model of motor control. This view assumes a sub-personal motor control system that uses 
comparisons between motor commands, predictions of movements, and sensory feedback for 
the control and fine-tuning of bodily movements (Wolpert & Kawato 1998, Frith et al. 2000). 
Schema theory can explain how complex movements can be initiated and guided smoothly 
without much effort and without conscious control, and the feedback-comparator model can 
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explain how the guidance of particular movements can be tailored to the features of the 
particular circumstances. Taken together, schema and feedback-comparator theory help to 
address the mentioned issues concerning cost, clumsiness, and overpopulation. The execution 
and orchestration of complex movements can be explained in terms of the initiation and 
guidance provided by motor schemata and the feedback-comparator system. Given this, there 
is no need to assume that the execution of all individual movements must be governed by 
specific personal-level attitudes (such as desires, beliefs, and intentions). Motor schemata can 
be refined with practice and their execution can be further fine-tuned by the feedback-
comparator system. This addresses the charge of clumsiness. And motor schemata can be 
executed automatically in the service of conscious goals and intentions, but without conscious 
attention and control. This further reduces the processing cost, and it helps us to see, 
moreover, that the challenge was overstated. When we acquire new motor skills, we often 
need to invest a great deal of mental effort and attention, and their execution often is rather 
costly and clumsy, at least at first. Supplemented with motor schema and feedback-
comparator theory, representational theories can explain why that is, and they can explain 
why the cost and clumsiness diminishes with practice.4 
4.2 Representation-hunger 
The term “representation-hunger” was coined by Clark & Toribio (1994). After a discussion 
of examples from robotics and from dynamical systems theory that are commonly evoked by 
anti-representationalists, Clark & Toribio state the core of their response to the anti-
representationalist challenge as follows: 
The basic trouble is one that afflicts all the case studies mentioned above. It is that the 
kinds of problem-domain invoked are just not sufficiently ‘representation-hungry’. 
Instead they are, without exception, domains in which suitable ambient environmental 
stimuli exist and can be pressed into service in place of internal representations. (418) 
                                                
4 In a similar proposal, Clark (1997) introduced the notion of “action oriented representations”: representations 
that “simultaneously describe aspects of the world and prescribe possible action, and are poised between pure 
control structures and passive representations of external reality” (49). They are assumed to be both belief-like 
and desire-like, and their primary explanatory import is to explain the smooth and effortless execution of the 
motor skills that are characteristic of skilled coping. Others posit similar representational entities, such as “motor 
intentions”, “motor representations”, or “goal representations”. See Pacherie 2008, Adams 2010, Butterfill & 
Sinigaglia 2012, for instance. 
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In cases of skilled coping, all the information that is required in order to initiate and guide an 
appropriate action is present in the environment. But it seems perfectly clear that this is not 
the case for all cases of cognition and agency. It seems, in fact, that paradigmatic examples of 
human cognition and agency involve cognition about things that are not present, such as in 
cases where our agency is guided by hypothetical reasoning or deliberation about the future. 
Such cases are representation-hungry in the sense that it is very difficult to see how they 
could be explained without the ascription of mental representations: agency is governed by 
cognition about things that are not present, and so it seems that something in the agent must 
“stand in” for the things that such instances of cognition are about. Clark & Toribio identified 
the two types of representation-hungry phenomena that have been discussed: cases that 
involve cognition about things that are absent, non-existent, or counterfactual, and cases that 
involve cognition about things that are unified at an abstract conceptual level—cognition 
about the absent and abstract, for short. Due to this, it seems clear that the case for non-
representationalist explanations does not generalize. Alternative non-representationalist 
explanations are typically motivated by reflections on skilled coping, and they are tailored to 
explain such cases. But as the behavioral response is in such cases always governed entirely 
by “suitable ambient environmental stimuli”, there is no good reason to think that such 
explanations can cover the full range of human cognition and agency (which includes 
cognition about the absent and abstract and agency that is governed by such cognition). 
This response from representation-hunger has shaped the debate about anti-
representationalism to a significant extent. In a recent reply, Degenaar & Myin (2014) argue 
that cognition about the absent and the abstract are not so representation-hungry after all. 
Concerning cognition about the absent, they offer a sketch of the following non-
representationalist account. Mental imagery can be construed in terms of the re-enactment and 
constructive reconfiguration of past experiences. One can combine this with a non-
representationalist account of direct perception, which does not posit mental representations. 
From this, one obtains a non-representationalist account of mental imagery. This shows that 
cognition about the absent does not “necessitate mental representations as explanantia”, as 
Degenaar & Myin put it, because mental imagery is, of course, often about the absent. 
Concerning cognition about the abstract, Degenaar & Myin argue more directly that it 
does not necessitate the ascription of mental representations. Cognition about the abstract is 
typically about states of affairs that have physically little in common. Degenaar & Myin grant 
that this involves “convergence of many variegated stimuli upon one neural correlate with 
physical integrity”. But they argue that this is not sufficient to “confer representational status” 
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(3646). The claim, as I understand, is that it would beg the question to presume that the neural 
correlates of such integration processes are the physical realizers of mental representations. 
All this raises a host of questions and issues. Cognition about the absent is clearly not 
exhausted by mental imagery, and we have been given no clue as to how we can explain 
phenomena like hypothetical reasoning or deliberation about the future without the ascription 
of mental representations. But even for mental imagery, it is unclear how it can be explained 
as the re-enactment of direct perception, as direct perception would seem to require the 
presence of what is perceived. Further, it may be true that cognition about the abstract does 
not “necessitate” mental representations as explanantia, but it remains nevertheless very 
difficult to see how it can be explained by non-representationalist versions of embodied 
cognition. 
I will not pursue those issues any further here. Rather, I would like to highlight the point 
that Degenaar & Myin took it for granted that they can meet the challenge from 
representation-hunger by addressing cognition about the absent and abstract. They took it for 
granted, that is, that cognition about the absent and about the abstract exhaust the domain of 
representation-hungry phenomena. In what follows, I will argue that this assumption is 
mistaken, because there is another important representation-hungry phenomenon: our ability 
to consider, choose, develop, and pursue intentions and long-term plans—our ability to 
engage in planning agency, for short. The main point will be that the radical and the more 
modest versions of anti-representationalism face a serious challenge from representation-
hunger, even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that cognition about the absent and the 
abstract are not representation-hungry. 
5. Temporally extended planning agency 
In the philosophy of mind and action, it is generally agreed that intentionality is the mark of 
genuine agency. For some time, it was also generally agreed that intentional agency can be 
explained in terms of the roles of the agent’s desires and beliefs (largely due to the influence 
of Davidson 1963). In particular, it was widely assumed that to act intentionally is to act for a 
reason, and that acting for a reason is to be explained in terms of causation and rationalization 
by the agent’s desires and beliefs. It is still widely held that there is a close connection 
between intentional action and acting for reasons—that intentional actions are usually 
performed for reasons. But the underlying claim that intentions can be reduced to desires and 
beliefs is now widely rejected (largely due to the influence of Bratman 1987). According to 
most contemporary versions of this standard theory of action, intentions play a crucial and 
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irreducible role in practical reasoning, long-term planning, and in the initiation and guidance 
of action. On this view, the intentionality of action is to be explained in terms of the initiation 
and guidance by intentions, construed as irreducible mental states. 
My argument against anti-representationalism will not depend on the claim that 
intentions cannot be reduced to desires and beliefs, and I will not summarize the arguments 
for this claim. But the following considerations are of relevance here. The claim that 
intentions are irreducible mental states can be motivated and defended on the basis of 
observations concerning our ability to engage in planning agency. The main idea behind this 
is relatively easy to see. The pursuit of plans often requires resolve and persistence—it 
requires mental states that are relatively stable. This stability is psychological and rational in 
nature. In particular, commitment to a plan requires that one does not reconsider the pursuit of 
the plan unless one has good reason to do so. Some desires are relatively persistent. But their 
stability is often merely psychological, in the sense that they tend to persist even if one has 
good reason not to pursue the desired end. Other desires are rather fleeting. Generally, it 
seems that desires (in combination with beliefs) do not provide the right basis to account for 
temporally extended and committed planning agency. Intentions, on the other hand, are 
individuated in terms of functional roles that provide the required stability by definition. For 
us, the important point is that any theory of intentional agency must account for the truism 
that we are able to develop and pursue long-term intentions and plans (Bratman 1987 and 
2000). The question of whether or not intentions can be reduced to other mental states is a 
separate issue that we can set aside here. 
On a terminological note, I often use the terms “intention” and “plan” interchangeably, 
under the assumption that plans are intentions. Sometimes, I use “plan” in order to emphasize 
the long-term and complex nature of some intentions. But there is no strict distinction 
implied. Intentions and plans can be concrete and specific. But they can also be rather abstract 
and vague, such as the plan to study law or to go on vacation sometime in April to some place 
with beautiful beaches. 
In what follows, I will contrast temporally extended planning agency with cases of 
skilled coping. In a sense, every instance of agency is of course temporally extended. But in 
cases of skilled coping the agent’s activity and engagement with the world is initiated and 
guided entirely by what is present, here and now, in the current circumstances (as the 
proponents of embodied cognition like to emphasize). When we engage in planning agency, 
in contrast, we form an intention, here and now, that is to be pursued and executed in the 
future. In this sense, planning agency is temporally extended, and skilled coping is not. 
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Further, planning agency is often temporally extended in the sense that it requires the further 
specification and development of intentions and plans. First, for instance, you decide to go on 
vacation sometime in April to some place with beautiful beaches. Later, you specify and 
develop the plan further by making decisions on places, times, means of transport, and so on. 
In the following section, I will argue that planning agency is a representation-hungry 
phenomenon. But first, I need to show that planning agency cannot be reduced to cognition 
about the absent and abstract. Intentions and plans are often based on deliberation about the 
future. Deliberation about the future is obviously about something that is not yet present and 
it is often conducted in abstract terms (including abstract normative terms, such as goodness, 
obligation, or reasonableness). One might think, then, that deliberation about the future can be 
reduced to cognition about the absent and abstract. If we assume that deliberation about the 
future can be reduced to cognition about the absent and abstract, we can see clearly that 
planning agency cannot, because planning agency is clearly not exhausted by deliberation 
about the future. In deliberation, the agent considers, here and now, what to do in the future. 
Planning agency usually involves more than that. It usually involves deliberation, the 
formation of intentions, and the pursuit and execution of the intended goals and actions. More 
to the point, cognition about the absent and abstract is something that the agent engages in 
here and now, whereas planning agency involves the pursuit and execution of intentions in the 
future. This shows that the ability to engage in planning agency cannot be reduced to the 
ability to engage in cognition about the absent and abstract. The upshot is that planning 
agency may be a representation-hungry phenomenon, even if cognition about the absent and 
the abstract are not. 
6. The representation-hunger of planning agency 
On the face of it, planning agency is a representation-hungry phenomenon, mainly for the 
following two reasons. First, in planning agency one pursues and executes plans that were 
formed or acquired at some point in the past. It seems that this pursuit of goals and actions 
must in some way be governed by something in the agent, some internal state, that mediates 
between the formation of the intention and the pursuit of the intended goals and actions. The 
most obvious candidate for such a meditating state seems to be an intention or plan, construed 
as a mental state that represents which goals and actions are to be pursued. Second, as 
mentioned, intentions and plans govern not only future actions, but also further deliberation 
and planning on how, exactly, to pursue and realize those plans. Typically, one does this by 
developing a hierarchical structure that specifies sub-goals, sub-actions, and sub-means 
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(Austin & Vancouver 1996). The most obvious theoretical framework to account for this 
systematic complexity seems to be a representational theory of cognition and agency, with its 
emphasis on internal processing, systematicity, compositionality, and cognitive decoupling 
(see Fodor & Pylyshyn 1988, for instance).5 
However, we have seen that we should be more careful. It may seem clear that a certain 
phenomenon invites the ascription of mental representations, and yet it may be false that its 
explanation requires the ascription of mental representations. However, I do not think that we 
need to show that a phenomenon “necessitates mental representations as explanantia” in order 
to show that it is representation-hungry (as suggested by Degenaar & Myin 2014). The 
challenge from representation-hunger is not supposed to disprove anti-representationalism by 
providing an unassailable argument that establishes necessitation. The challenge is more 
modest. It is supposed to raise a serious challenge for anti-representationalism by showing 
that the explanation of a certain phenomenon calls for an explanation in terms of mental 
representations.6 This, I propose, requires two things. First, if it is not obvious, it must be 
shown that the phenomenon in question can be explained in terms of mental representations. 
Second, if it is not obvious, it must be shown that it is very difficult to see how one could 
explain the phenomenon without the ascription of mental representations. In other words, to 
show that a phenomenon calls for an explanation in terms of mental representations requires 
an inference to the best explanation in the form of the following inference to the only 
explanation: an explanation in terms of mental representations provides the best explanation, 
because it provides the only plausible explanation of the phenomenon in question. 
As indicated, the explanation of planning agency clearly invites the ascription of mental 
representations—it is obvious that it can be explained in terms of mental representations. 
What needs to be shown, then, is that it is very difficult to see how planning agency can be 
explained without the ascription of mental representations. How can this be achieved? I 
suggest the following divide-and-conquer strategy: I will consider the explanatory resources 
that current anti-representationalist versions of embodied cognition have on offer, and I will 
                                                
5 Fodor & Pylyshyn (1988) appealed to systematicity and compositionality in order to argue for a classical 
symbol processing account of representationalism and for the language of thought hypothesis, in particular. My 
point here is much more modest: the complex hierarchical systematicity of planning agency seems to call for a 
representational theory of cognition and agency. No further claims about symbol processing or about a language 
of thought are implied. 
6 This is how I understand Clark & Toribio’s (1994) challenge. They took themselves to have identified a serious 
challenge, not an unassailable proof that establishes an impossibility. 
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show that they cannot explain planning agency. This, I submit, will suffice to show that it is 
very difficult to see how planning agency could be explained without the ascription of mental 
representations. It will not establish that a non-representationalist explanation is impossible, 
mainly because it will be based on considerations concerning the explanatory resources of 
current anti-representationalist accounts. But it will raise a serious challenge for anti-
representationalism, as we will see. 
There are by now many different accounts of embodied cognition on offer. We focus 
here on the anti-representationalist variants, and we can identify five explanatory resources 
that this approach to cognition and agency has on offer: explanations in terms of (1) 
affordances, (2) re-enactment, (3) behavioral dispositions and habits, (4) the internalization of 
linguistic and socially scaffolded abilities, and (5) dynamical systems theory. These are the 
explanatory resources of anti-representationalist versions of embodied cognition, as we 
currently know them. We turn now to each one in turn. 
6.1 Affordances 
Most anti-representationalists appeal to affordances, but there is no generally agreed account 
or definition. In this respect, the notion of affordance is the non-representationalist 
counterpart to the notion of mental representation. But as for mental representation, we can 
identify a shared minimal characterization. Borrowing from Chemero (2009: Ch. 7), 
affordances can be characterized as “directly perceivable opportunities for action”. The main 
idea here is that the way in which we perceive the world is already structured in terms of 
possibilities for action and interaction: we perceive the world in terms of the actions it 
affords. The explanatory import of the appeal to affordances is to explain how an agent can 
interact with the environment in an intelligent and appropriate manner without conscious 
deliberation and without having to represent parts or aspects of the situation. The suggestion 
is that affordances can explain this, because they are objective features of the situation that 
can “bring forth” the relevant responses and interactions, typically in interaction with the 
agent’s behavioral dispositions and habits (Gibson 1979, Chemero 2009; see also Clark 1997, 
Menary 2007). 
No matter how this idea is further developed, it is clear that an appeal to affordances 
cannot explain planning agency. When one pursues and executes intentions and plans, one 
must be sensitive to the features of the particular situation. But, in planning agency, actions 
and interactions are partly governed by intentions and plans, not merely by the features of the 
present circumstances. In particular, they are governed by intentions and plans that the agent 
has formed at some point in the past, and the agent is governed by them through changing 
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and, sometimes, unpredictable circumstances. In other words, in planning agency, actions and 
interactions are often governed with a high degree of independence from the present 
circumstances. Appeal to affordances may help to explain intelligent interactions that are 
governed by features that are present, here and now. But it clearly cannot explain temporally 
extended planning agency. 
6.2 Re-enactment 
As mentioned (section 4.2), it has been proposed that mental imagery can be explained in 
terms of the re-enactment of perceptual experiences. Combined with a non-representationalist 
account of direct perception, this seems to provide a non-representationalist account of mental 
imagery (Degenaar & Myin 2014). The re-enactment of perception is temporally extended, in 
the obvious sense that an earlier instance of perception is enacted later. But it is nevertheless 
very difficult to see how an appeal to re-enactment could possibly explain planning agency. 
Perhaps, one might think, it is possible to explain deliberation and practical reasoning entirely 
in terms of the re-enactment (and re-combination) of past experiences. But even if that were 
possible, it would not help to explain planning agency. Intentions and plans are often based on 
deliberation and practical reasoning, but planning agency involves clearly more than that—it 
involves the pursuit of intentions and plans in the future (see section 5). One possibility here 
is to explain the initiation and guidance of future actions in terms of the re-enactment of 
deliberation. But this is hopelessly implausible, and it is contradicted by an enormous amount 
of evidence from everyday experience. When you get up in the morning in order to catch a 
plane, for instance, you do not have to remind yourself of the reasons for travelling. Once we 
have formed an intention or made a plan, we are able to pursue it without having to repeat the 
deliberation and without having to remind ourselves of the reasons at every step in the pursuit 
and realization of the plan (see Bratman 1987). I cannot see any other way in which an appeal 
to re-enactment might help here, and so I conclude that it cannot explain planning agency. 
6.3 Behavioral dispositions and habits 
Behavioral dispositions and habits are usually acquired in processes of development or 
learning and they are usually manifested later, under certain conditions. Appeal to behavioral 
dispositions and habits can thereby explain the initiation and guidance of future actions, and 
so it can explain how agency can be temporally extended. But it will become clear that it 
cannot explain temporally extended planning agency. 
Let us begin with habits. Representationalist theories usually hold that habits can be 
explained in terms of the initiation and guidance by the relevant mental states. Davidson, for 
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instance, noted that “we cannot suppose that whenever an agent acts intentionally he goes 
through a process of deliberation or reasoning” (1978: 85). His example is an agent who adds 
spice to a stew with the intention of improving the taste. We can certainly imagine that this 
action is habitual, such that the agent’s mind is preoccupied with something else. The action 
seems nevertheless to be intentional, given that it is governed by the relevant representational 
mental states (in this case, the desire the improve the taste and the belief that adding spice is 
the appropriate means to this end). 
Non-representationalist theories need a different account. The obvious candidate is a 
direct appeal to behavioral dispositions or tendencies. With repetition and practice, the agent 
acquires dispositions to perform certain actions in certain circumstances, and such processes 
may be construed as changes in the brain, changes in the body, or as changes in the person as 
a whole. Like all dispositional properties, behavioral dispositions interact with their stimulus 
conditions, which explains how the relevant circumstances can play a role in the initiation and 
guidance of the behavior. It is clear, however, that not all the relevant aspects of planning 
agency can be explained in terms of such a non-representationalist account of habitual action. 
Consider again one of our examples. You form the intention to go on vacation 
sometime in April to some place with beautiful beaches. In order to explain this in terms of a 
habit, you would have to have the habit to take such vacations. Now, of course, you might 
have this habit, but you might just as well not. This points to an important feature of our 
ability to engage in planning agency: it enables us to plan and pursue novel actions and 
projects. For all we know, it might be the first time that you plan to go on a vacation 
sometime in April to some place with beautiful beaches, and it might be the first time that you 
plan to go on a vacation by yourself. You may have no relevant habit, not even of going on 
vacations, and yet you are able to make and pursue the plan. Obviously, examples could be 
multiplied. Consider someone who plans to do a Master’s degree in cognitive science. Few 
people do more than one Master’s degree, and hardly anyone can be said to have a habit of 
doing so. Yet, we are able to plan and to do such things. 
Now, most of the particular actions that one performs in pursuit of a novel plan may be 
habitual. But even if all of the particular actions are habitual, the overall orchestration of the 
plan may still be novel. It may be, for instance, that all the actions that you perform in order 
to realize your plan of going on vacation are habitual (getting out of bed, calling a taxi, 
boarding a plan, and so on). It may still be that this is the first time that you pursue this plan— 
this particular constellation of the habitual actions in question. 
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This shows that planning agency cannot be explained in terms of habits. But it does not 
show that planning agency cannot be explained in terms of behavioral dispositions, because 
not all behavioral dispositions are habits. In particular, not all behavioral dispositions are 
acquired in processes of habit formation. The acquisition of some behavioral dispositions may 
be the development of innate tendencies. Others may be acquired in instances of one-shot 
learning, in which only one encounter with a rewarding (or punishing) event is sufficient to 
establish the disposition. Further, it is possible that we acquire behavioral dispositions by 
making decisions. In particular, anti-representationalists may suggest that making a decision 
just is the formation of a behavior disposition (or cluster of dispositions). 
This is not entirely implausible. Consider so called “implementation intentions”: 
intentions to perform certain actions in certain circumstances (Gollwitzer & Sheeran 2006). 
Suppose, for instance, you decide to invite your friend for dinner when you see her at work. 
The suggestion is that this consists in the formation of a disposition to perform the relevant 
speech act when the condition obtains. This, it seems, shows how planning agency can be 
explained without the ascription of mental representations.7 However, all it shows is that the 
ascription of very simple and specific intentions may not require the ascription of mental 
representations. There are many instances of planning agency that are more complex, and it 
remains very difficult to see how the appeal to behavioral dispositions could possibly explain 
more complex cases. 
As noted, many intentions and plans have contents that are relatively vague, abstract, 
and potentially very complex. Consider again the intention to do a Master’s degree or to go on 
vacation sometime in April to some place with beautiful beaches. The content of such 
intentions need not and usually does not specify particular actions, because when one forms 
such intentions, the plan is usually still too vague and abstract. Indeed, it seems clear that one 
cannot have or acquire any behavioral dispositions in such cases, because there are no 
particular act-types that correspond to the contents in question. In order to facilitate the 
acquisition of behavioral dispositions, the content of such intentions must first be made more 
specific. This means that the formation of intentions with such contents cannot be reduced to 
the formation of behavioral dispositions—behavioral dispositions can ground only the 
                                                
7 This is traditional behaviorism, according to which the ascription of mental states can be analyzed in terms of 
the ascription of behavioral dispositions. This view is untenable for well-known reasons. In this section, I will 
argue that it is untenable for further and independent reasons concerning planning agency. 
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ascription of contents that are relatively simple and concrete.8 This shows, then, that the 
formation of intentions and plans cannot, in general, consist in the formation of behavioral 
dispositions. 
Note that this point concerns, in part, the abstract nature of many of our intentions and 
plans. This does not mean that the representation-hunger of planning agency can be reduced 
to the representation-hunger of cognition about the abstract. Cognition about the abstract is 
something that one engages in here and now. Planning agency is temporally extended. In 
order to explain planning agency, one must explain how intentions and plans that are formed 
here and now can initiate and guide further planning and future action. 
6.4 The internalization of linguistic and socially scaffolded abilities 
In broad outline, the main idea here is that we acquire the higher functions that are distinctive 
of human cognition and agency by being brought up in and by interacting with a socio-
cultural environment that is already loaded with symbols, norms, meaning, and shared 
purposes (Clark 1997, Menary 2007, Hutto & Myin 2013). Later in development, some of 
those abilities become mental abilities through processes of internalization (Vygotsky 1986, 
Sterelny 2010). This is a grand vision, and there is no commonly accepted and fully 
developed version of this view. To get a better grip on the idea, it will help to consider an 
example. Take, for instance, the abilities to count and add numbers. It seems that those are 
paradigmatic examples of tasks that we do “in our heads”—they are examples of “mental 
arithmetic”. However, we typically learn how to count and how to add by being taught how to 
perform embodied actions, using our fingers for counting, grouping apples and oranges, and 
so on. It seems that it is only later, with practice, that such activities become mental activities, 
through processes of internalization. Let us grant that this appeal to the internalization of 
abilities is plausible and tenable. Can it help to explain planning agency? 
A first thing to note here is that this approach seems to get the order of explanation 
backwards. The suggestion would be that planning agency can be explained in terms of the 
internalization of linguistic and socially scaffolded abilities. But it seems that in order to be 
able to participate in linguistic and social practices one must already have the ability to 
engage in intentional planning agency. This is clear for instances of explicit learning, in 
                                                
8 I do not mean to suggest that behavioral dispositions are entirely inflexible. It must be acknowledged, on all 
views, that particular manifestations of behavioral dispositions can be sensitive to the particular constraints of 
the situation and that they can exhibit some flexibility in the expression of the type. But this does not ground the 
ascription of the kinds of contents under consideration here. 
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which one is taught to follow certain rules, as the ability to follow rules seems to require the 
ability to form and pursue intentions. But this point holds also for higher cognitive abilities 
that are acquired implicitly, such as by learning through imitation. In such cases, one does not 
engage in planning agency by way of following rules. But one is, nevertheless, already 
engaged in shared and cooperative agency when one acquires linguistic and social skills in 
such ways. And it seems that the ability to engage in shared and cooperative agency 
presupposes the ability to engage in intentional planning agency. In general, and as argued by 
Tomasello et al. (2005), the ability to engage in “socially coordinated action plans” is a 
precondition for “uniquely human activities such as the creation and use of linguistic and 
mathematical symbols” and for “the creation of social practices and institutions” (676). As 
Tomasello et al. suggest, “linguistic communication without these underlying skills [of shared 
planning agency] is incoherent” (690).9 
More importantly, the appeal to internalization generates a dilemma. To spell out the 
obvious, when an ability is internalized it becomes an internal state (process, structure, or 
property of the agent). What kind of state? Generally and metaphysically speaking, it seems 
that there are only two options. The internalization of abilities can be construed as the 
formation of representational mental states or as the acquisition of behavioral dispositions and 
habits (which can be construed, further, in terms of changes in the brain, changes in the body, 
or as changes in the person as a whole). Given this, anti-representationalists must construe the 
internalization of abilities in terms of behavioral dispositions and habits. But we have already 
seen that planning agency cannot be explained in terms of behavioral dispositions and habits. 
The only credible option, here, is to explain internalization in terms of mental representations. 
This, I think, is not much of a surprise, as the internalization of higher cognitive abilities 
appears itself to be a representation-hungry phenomenon. 
In connection with that, note that an explanation of planning agency requires an 
explanation of how decisions, which result in the formation of intentions, can initiate and 
guide future behavior. It must identify something in or about the agent that establishes this 
connection: something that mediates between decisions that are made earlier and pursued 
later. Without this, planning agency remains mysterious. The appeal to linguistic and socially 
scaffolded abilities alone cannot explain how decisions can initiate and guide future behavior. 
Appeal to the internalization of such abilities might provide an explanation, because it evokes 
                                                
9 No doubt, some anti-representationalists will deny this (in particular, enactivists such as Fuchs & de Jaegher 
2009). I will not attempt here to bolster the arguments from Tomasello (and colleagues), but note instead that my 
main objection is the point that follows. 
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agent-internal states. But this brings us only back to where we were before. What kind of state 
could play this role? Anti-representationalists cannot assume that this connection is 
established by representational mental states. They must, it seems, assume that those 
connections are established by behavioral dispositions and habits. But, again, we have already 
seen that planning agency cannot be explained in terms of behavioral dispositions and 
habits.10 
6.5 Dynamical systems theory 
The central idea here is to treat cognitive systems as dynamical systems and to explain their 
behavior by adopting the mathematical tools of dynamical systems theory (van Gelder 1995). 
In broad outline, to treat cognitive systems as dynamical systems is to propose that they are 
closely coupled with their environment and that their behavior is to be explained in terms of 
this dynamical coupling. This amounts to a rejection of the view we can isolate cognitive 
systems and explain their behavior in terms of the interactions of their internal components or 
intrinsic properties. As Silberstein & Chemero (2011) put it, this view replaces a “component-
dominant” approach with an “interaction-dominant” approach. Dynamical systems theory 
uses non-linear differential equations to describe and explain the behavior of such systems. 
Those equations capture multi-dimensional state spaces that describe how the relevant 
parameters and states of such systems evolve through time. The suggestion is that such 
descriptions provide explanations if they identify trajectories and patterns that support 
successful predictions.11 One common feature of dynamical system accounts is the 
identification of “attractors” (or “attractor basins”). Very roughly, an attractor is a region in 
the state space towards which various parameters of the system gravitate when they get close 
                                                
10 Hutto & Myin (2013) also appeal to scaffolded abilities, but they appear to reject the view that such abilities 
become internalized (137–138). On their view, mental arithmetic, and other cases of mental agency, are 
“decoupled” and “independent of context” (152–153). It has not become clear to me why this is supposed to 
show that mental abilities are not internalized in a way that raises a representation-hunger challenge. But, in any 
case, the important point here is that denying internalization is of no help in the present context, because only the 
internalization of linguistic and socially scaffolded abilities has the potential to explain planning agency. 
11 Kaplan & Craver (2011) argue that dynamical system descriptions are explanatory only if they indicate how 
the system parameters correspond to the interacting parts of an underlying causal mechanism. If correct, this 
undermines the view of most proponents of the dynamical systems approach, because they usually hold that the 
parameters correspond to emergent properties of system-environment couplings (not to the components of an 
underlying mechanism). I tend to agree with Kaplan & Craver, but I assume, for the sake of argument, that 
dynamical system descriptions can provide explanations independently of identifying causal mechanisms. 
20 
to it. They can be associated with actions and interactions that the system tends to exhibit 
under certain conditions. 
Does this dynamical systems perspective explain planning agency? Can it explain 
planning agency? Proponents of this approach have themselves provided negative answers to 
the first question. For instance, Dreyfus (2000a) appeals to dynamical systems theory in his 
defense of modest anti-representationalism: 
Past experience has set up the neuron connections so that the current perceptual input, 
which is similar to some past input but never exactly like it, puts the brain area that 
controls movement into a specific energy landscape. Once that brain area is in that 
landscape, movements are caused that tend to move the brain state closer to the bottom 
of the nearest basin of attraction. (2000a: 382) 
The main claim, here, is that dynamical systems theory can provide a non-representationalist 
account of habitual behavior and habit formation. But, as I have argued, not all planning 
agency is habitual. Even if the execution of certain plans consists entirely in the execution of 
habitual actions, the orchestration of such actions may nevertheless be novel and not habitual. 
Dreyfus seems to accept this, and he seems to accept that the explanation of intentional 
planning agency requires the ascription of representational mental states. 
Silberstein & Chemero (2011) offer a rather different account of agency in terms of 
dynamical systems theory. Approaching this issue, they discuss an experiment in which 
participants play a simple video game by using a mouse: 
Because the mouse and the object it controls on the monitor are constituent parts of the 
interaction-dominant cognitive system, there is no separation between the cognitive 
system and the environment that must be bridged by representations. […] This anti-
representationalism is […] the key to the understanding of agency and action. (2011: 6) 
The focus of their investigation is restricted to agency that is initiated and guided entirely by 
the features of the circumstances. This is, unfortunately, characteristic of much of the work on 
embodied cognition. “The system and the environment are inseparable” and “agent and 
environment are co-dependent sides of the same coin”, as Silberstein & Chemero maintain, 
and “so there is no need for intervening representation” (2011: 11 and 15). As should be clear 
by now, this neglects the obvious. It neglects the truism that we are planning agents, and that 
planning agency is temporally extended, in the sense explained. 
More importantly, Silberstein & Chemero seem to admit, implicitly, that the dynamical 
systems perspective cannot explain temporally extended planning agency. When they address 
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the question of how to construe intentions within the dynamical systems approach, they 
follow Juarrero (2010) in suggesting that intentions are “order parameters that constrain the 
activity of system components” (Silberstein & Chemero 2011: 15). This means, in part, that 
having an intention is an emergent property of the “brain-body-environment” system, rather 
than an internal state of the agent, and it means that intentions “do not act as efficient causes”. 
Rather, intentions, so construed, “must somehow correspond to the intentional structuring of 
action, without being something over and above the action” (14). On this view, intentions are 
necessarily intrinsic to the action itself—they are, quite literally, in the action. This makes it 
perfectly clear that this view cannot explain planning agency. The explanation of planning 
agency requires intentions that can be formed here and now and pursued in the future—it 
requires intentions that are the antecedents of action. Given this, it is clear that planning 
agency cannot be explained by the offered dynamical systems account. 
According to Silberstein & Chemero, intentions must be intrinsic to the action, because 
agency is to be explained in terms of the inseparable coupling between agent and 
environment. But perhaps they are wrong about this. More generally, perhaps the proponents 
of the dynamical systems approach are mislead by their focus on skilled coping, and perhaps 
that is why they overlook that dynamical systems theory might provide the resources to 
explain planning agency after all.  
There is, it seems, an obvious possibility. One might suggest that intentions can be 
identified with attractors that evolve over time. It might seem that this can explain how 
intentions can be formed here and now and executed in the future, and it might seem that this 
accommodates the point that some intentions are further developed in the pursuit of the goal. 
This is a possibility. But it generates a fatal dilemma. It seems that such attractors would have 
to correspond either to properties of the coupled agent-environment system, as suggested by 
Silberstein & Chemero, or to internal states of the agent. The former cannot be correct. The 
circumstances in which an intention is formed are often very different from the circumstances 
in which it is further developed and pursued. Agent-environment couplings, which are 
changing constantly, simply do not provide physical realizers that are stable enough to be the 
physical realizers of intentions and plans. The role of intentions is to take the agent from their 
formation to their execution, through changing circumstances. Given this, it seems that their 
physical realizers must be states of the agent. On the dynamical systems approach, this means 
that the relevant attractors would have to correspond to states of the agent. What kinds of 
states might that be? As before, it seems that there are only two candidates: representational 
mental states and behavioral dispositions (which may be construed as properties of the brain, 
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the body, or of the person as a whole). Appeal to the former is, of course, not an option for 
anti-representationalists, and I have already argued that the appeal to behavioral dispositions 
cannot explain planning agency. It cannot explain, in particular, the development, 
orchestration, and execution of novel plans and actions. 
Here is another way to look at this. In order to explain planning agency, the appeal to 
attractors would have to explain our ability to further develop and specify our intentions and 
plans. The formation of plans often begins at a fairly abstract level and their development 
typically follows a hierarchical structure of specification (Austin & Vancouver 1996). You 
intend to take a vacation sometime in April at some place with beautiful beaches. As you go 
along, you specify sub-goals and means. In order to capture such planning agency, attractors 
would have to be assigned abstract contents and separate attractors would have to be 
associated, somehow, with the relevant sub-goals and means of such hierarchical structures. 
Further, in order to explain how intentions and plans can be pursued through changing 
environments, such attractors would have to correspond to relatively stable states of the 
agent. Taken together, all that just means that such attractors would have to correspond to 
representational mental states. Dreyfus remarked that attractors that explain agency “could be 
called representations”, but only in a “very weak sense” (2000a: 383). We can see now that 
attractors that can explain planning agency would have to be called mental representations in 
a very strong sense. 
Another possibility is to appeal to so called “coordinative structures”. Defined in the 
abstract, coordinative structures are “macroscopic spatio-temporal patterns” that constrain the 
degrees of freedom of some of the system’s component parts (Huys et al. 2004: 360). 
Proponents of the dynamical systems approach have introduced this notion to explain how the 
motor system selects one particular string of movements in order to achieve a given goal. It is 
clear that, in this application, coordinative structures are not supposed to explain anything as 
high-level as the kind of planning agency under consideration here. But we can ask, again, 
whether coordinative structures might be of help in this respect. 
Arguably, coordinative structures must be relatively stable features of the agent in order 
to constrain some of the agent’s degrees of freedom. However, as argued above, in order to 
explain planning agency, such states of the agent would have to be assigned abstract contents 
that can be organized in hierarchical structures. So, as before, we would have to assume that 
those states carry the hallmarks of mental representation. 
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7. The challenge to radical and modest anti-representationalism 
The explanatory resources of anti-representationalist versions of embodied cognition cannot 
explain planning agency. It is, at least, very difficult to see how any one of them could, and it 
is very difficult to see how any combination of those explanatory resources could. We can 
conclude, then, that current anti-representationalist versions of embodied cognition do not 
have the resources to explain planning agency, and we can conclude that planning agency is 
indeed a representation-hungry phenomenon. This is a serious challenge for both radical and 
modest versions of anti-representationalism. 
According to radical anti-representationalism, we should seek to explain all instances of 
human cognition and agency without the ascription of mental representations. The ability to 
engage in planning agency is not an expert skill or some fringe ability that is rarely used. It is, 
rather, an important ability at the very core of human cognition and agency that governs and 
constrains most of our daily activities. Non-representationalism does not provide the 
resources to explain this very important core ability. As we have seen, the problem is not just 
that there is no fully worked out and generally accepted non-representationalist account. Far 
from it, the problem is that non-representationalist versions of embodied cognition do not 
even provide an indication or programmatic sketch as to how they might explain planning 
agency. Given this, the methodological imperative that we should seek explanations of all 
instances of human cognition and agency without the ascription of mental representations is 
misguided. The pursuit of non-representationalist explanations has delivered interesting and 
important insights, and it may well be that it will continue to do so. But there is, as I have 
argued, no reason to think that non-representationalist accounts will ever be able to explain 
the full range of human cognition and agency (including planning agency). 
According to modest anti-representationalism, a significant portion of human cognition 
and agency is to be explained without the ascription of mental representations. Typically, this 
view restricts its anti-representationalism to the explanation of skilled coping, broadly 
construed, and it grants that the explanation of higher cognition and deliberate planning 
agency does require the ascription of mental representations. But this restriction of anti-
representationalism to skilled coping does not save the view from the present challenge. 
Note, first of all, that most instances of skilled copying are in the service of higher 
intentions and plans. They are usually sub-actions or sub-routines that we perform in order to 
achieve higher ends or long-term goals. Consider embodied skills such as typing on a 
keyboard, playing chords on an instrument, or all the sub-actions that one performs when one 
is driving a car. Such actions are usually not performed for their own sake, but in pursuit of 
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some higher intention or plan. This raises the obvious question of how the relevant higher 
intentions and plans can initiate and guide the performance of skilled coping. 
Representationalism can offer an answer in terms of sub-personal entities and mechanisms, as 
outlined in section 4.1. With practice, we build up a repertoire of motor schemata, which 
explains how the execution of motoric skills can become automatic and embedded in higher 
planning structures of intentional agency. The guidance of particular instances can be 
explained by a feedback-comparator theory of motor control. How this works, exactly, is 
largely an empirical question. But representationalism provides the basic idea: skilled coping 
can be initiated and guided by higher intentions and long-term plans, because the relevant 
personal level and sub-personal level entities are all representational entities (see Pacherie 
2008, Clarke 2010, Butterfill & Sinigaglia 2012, for instance).12 
Note, further, that even instances of skilled coping that are not in the service of higher 
intentions and plans are usually constrained by them. Consider, for instance, actions such as 
going for walk or whistling a tune. Often, such actions are spontaneous, in the sense that they 
are not planned. But even if they are not planned, they are usually constrained by the agent’s 
plans and the commitments that they entail. Usually, one does not go for a walk or whistle a 
tune whenever the circumstances permit or whenever one feels like doing so. Rather, usually 
one does so only when the circumstances permit and only when it coheres with one’s 
overarching intentions and plans. Now we face the question of how intentions and plans can 
constrain the performance of such actions. Again, representationalism suggests an answer. As 
the execution of such spontaneous actions is assumed to be guided by representational 
entities, such as motor schemata, we can see how their performance could be constrained by 
other representational entities, such as intentions and plans. 
The challenge for modest anti-representationalism is to find an alternative answer. How 
can higher intentions and long-term plans initiate, guide, and constrain instances of skilled 
coping, given that skilled coping is, by hypothesis, not to be explained in terms of 
representational mental states? It is very difficult to see how modest anti-representationalism 
                                                
12 Butterfill & Sinigaglia (2012) point out that such explanations face a difficult “interface problem”: how do the 
propositional contents of intentions interface with the non-propositional contents of motor representations (at the 
sub-personal level)? They consider a solution in terms of “translation”: a sub-personal mechanism may translate 
the contents of intentions into the more specific format of the contents of motor representations (see also 
Pacherie 2008). But as we have currently no direct evidence for the existence of such a mechanism, they advance 
an alternative explanation in terms of “deference”: intentions refer to specific motor actions by deferring to 
motor representations. 
25 
could possibly square this circle, because the view grants that higher intentions and long-term 
plans are representational mental states. Modest anti-representationalism turns out to be an 
unstable position. Consider the following three propositions: 
(1) The explanation of skilled coping does not require the ascription of mental 
representations. 
(2) Skilled coping is often initiated, guided, or constrained by higher intentions and long-
term plans. 
(3) Higher intentions and long-term plans are mental representations. 
Modest anti-representationalism is committed to 1 and acknowledges 3 (unlike radical anti-
representationalism, which denies 3). Above, I have argued for 2. Given this, we obtain a 
contradiction. Given 2, skilled coping is to be explained, at least in part, by higher intentions 
and long-term plans. This contradicts 1, given 3.13 
8. Conclusion 
Planning agency cannot be reduced to cognition about the absent and abstract, and it is very 
difficult to see how it could be explained without the ascription of mental representations. We 
have seen, in particular, that anti-representationalism faces a serious challenge from 
representation-hunger, even if we grant, for the sake of argument, that cognition about the 
absent and the abstract are not representation-hungry. It is important to note that this 
challenge does more than just identify another representation-hungry phenomenon. As 
pointed out, the challenge from cognition about the absent and abstract is a challenge to 
radical anti-representationalism, whereas the challenge from planning agency is a challenge 
to both radical and modest anti-representationalism. Moreover, we have seen that modest 
anti-representationalism is an unstable position. This is a very significant result, because most 
anti-representationalists are modest anti-representationalists (as far as I can tell). 
                                                
13 According to Dreyfus, “there can be two distinct kinds of intentional behavior: deliberative, planned action, 
and spontaneous, transparent coping” (2002b: 417). This raises the obvious question of how skilled coping can 
be in the service of planning agency, and Dreyfus realizes that he cannot allow guidance by higher intentions and 
plans (because this would be guidance by mental representations). Dreyfus finds himself forced to propose that 
higher intentions and plans “simply trigger” instances of skilled coping. But this is highly implausible. It flies in 
the face of common experience, which suggests that instances of skilled coping are often also guided, 
modulated, and constrained by higher intentions and plans during their execution. Moreover, even a mere 
triggering has clearly explanatory import: if skilled coping is triggered by higher intentions and plans, then it is 
to be explained, at least in part, in terms of mental representations. 
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Clark & Toribio (1994) discussed the possible objection that the challenge from 
representation-hunger appears to be a retreat, rather than a victory, even if it is successful. The 
challenge, it may seem, concedes that mental representations are required only in order to 
explain particularly sophisticated “tip-of-the-iceberg” capacities that are deployed only in rare 
moments of conscious reasoning and reflective deliberation. The challenge may therefore 
appear to be a retreat, and one may think that the “moral victory” goes to the anti-
representationalist after all (419 and 426). In their reply, Clark & Toribio pointed out that 
cognition about the absent and the abstract are far more mundane and widely used than the 
objection suggests. We frequently and quickly engage in counterfactual reasoning while we 
interact with the world, and we engage in cognition about the abstract whenever we subsume 
heterogeneous stimuli under some common category (426–427). 
To this, we can add that planning agency is clearly not a particularly sophisticated or 
rarely used ability. As pointed out, planning agency orchestrates and constrains most of our 
everyday activities. It is, in fact, difficult to think of clear instances of human agency that are 
not motivated, guided, or constrained by our intentions and long-term plans. One might 
overlook this, because one might think that we do not very often engage in conscious 
deliberation and reasoning (relative to the overall number of judgments that we make very 
day). But only one conscious decision, such as the decision to take a vacation, can have a 
pervasive influence on our daily activities. 
Further, planning agency appears to be an important core ability from an evolutionary 
point of view. The ability to make and pursue plans certainly appears to be highly 
advantageous and adaptive, in terms of fitness and survival. It may well be, even, that we are 
able to engage in cognition about the absent and abstract because this enables us to deliberate 
about the future, and it may be that we are able to deliberate about the future because this 
enables us to make and pursue plans. 
All in all, we can safely conclude that the challenge from representation-hunger is by no 
means a retreat. It is a serious challenge for the radical and the more modest anti-
representationalist versions of embodied cognition. Given this, we can conclude furthermore 
that the representationalist project remains well-motivated, because the explanation of human 
agency calls for the ascription of mental representations, notwithstanding the current lack of a 
generally accepted account of mental representation. 
Finally, let me briefly address the question of why the debate about anti-
representationalism has overlooked planning agency. One reason may be the focus on skilled 
coping and on agent-environment couplings. This focus is characteristic of the anti-
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representationalist approach, but, to some extent, it has also steered representationalist 
theorizing. For instance, a good deal of attention has been devoted to the debate on the nature 
and explanatory power of so called “action oriented representations” (Clark 1997).14 The two 
main questions here have been whether the appeal to action oriented representations can 
explain skilled coping and whether they are genuine representations (Wheeler 2005, 
Gallagher 2008, Adams 2010, Clowes & Mendonça 2016). These are interesting and 
important questions. But the focus on such questions concerning skilled coping may have led 
to the neglect of equally interesting and important questions concerning planning agency. 
It has become clear, I hope, that our ability to engage in planning agency requires more 
attention than it has received in this debate. Any theory that claims or aspires to provide a 
satisfactory account of human cognition and agency must show, or at least indicate, how it 
can explain our ability to make and pursue plans. The proponents of anti-representationalist 
versions of embodied cognition do not provide any clues—when it comes to explaining 
temporally extended planning agency, they do not even whistle in the dark. 
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